In September 2019, ‘Stop Baloch Genocide’ poster campaign was organised at the Broken Chair monument area in Geneva, which coincided with
the 42nd session of the UNHRC. This was participated in by Non-governmental organisations and civil society groups from Pak-occupied Kashmir(PoK), Balochistan and Sindh.
About a year later on, 11 coal miners working in the Mach area of Bolan district, about 100 km southeast of Quetta, the capital of the Pakistani province of Balochistan, were kidnapped and murdered on the night of January 2. All
the deceased miners belonged to the Hazara caste of Shia Muslims, who are one amongst the many persecuted Muslim sects in Pakistan, other than minorities.
People in Skardu in Gilgit-Baltistan in Pakistan occupied-Kashmir (PoK) on Saturday organised a massive rally against the Pakistani army who are primarily being held responsible for the killing of 11 coal miners, belonging to the Shiite Hazara community,
in a terror attack earlier this week.
Though the Islamic State: a tactical affiliate of Tehrik -e-Taliban(TTP) of Pakistan, has taken
responsibility for the terror act that took place on January 5, the locals of the place have blamed the Pakistan Army for the attack and condemned the Pakistan Army to use them to suppress all minorities and ethnic Baloch, into submission, for their game with
Is it that Pakistan Army and its Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) are brewing yet another cocktail of Sectarian rift, to have
a leash on the inevitable new Political Taliban in Afghanistan, using its grasp on ISIS Khorsan Province (ISIS(KP)) and TTP, though both of the latter are now understood to be proxies of Pakistan Army.
For Afghan Identity First
In 2018, Hazara political representatives expressed willingness to join talks with the Afghan Taliban. Afghan Taliban’s appointment of a militiaman from the Hazara community
as a local chief in northern Sar-i-Pul province appeared to indicate a political and ethnic change in its attitude toward the minority group, which it had persecuted for decades, on the teachings of Radical Islam by Pakistan Islamist Groups, at behest of Pakistan
The choice of Hazara leader Mahdi was a clear message to the Hazara community, and all other groups in Afghanistan, that the Taliban
are no longer against them, while pitching for a Federal Afghanistan Identity. Political Taliban was now striving to win the favor and support of all other groups of Afghans including minorities, a far cry from the Taliban of the 90s.
But, does it augurs well with the Radical Islamist manner of “divide and rule”, employed by Pakistan Army since decades, to keep the region especially Afghanistan’s
progress in check?
ISIS(KP) and TTP
Pakistan Vitalizes rival Groups to counter Political Taliban’s Inclusive Approach
Since 1990s, the preeminent terror organization
operating in South Asia has been Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). While LeT’s literature speaks of global jihad, the organization has restricted itself to the task given by ISI and Pakistan Army to it, in Kashmir.
Despite the fact that LeT follows the Ahl al-Hadith interpretative tradition of Islam, which shares same curriculum that ISI fostered madrassas had taught to bring up the Taliban of the 90s.
This same affinity was merged with al-Qaeda’s Salafist orientation, post 2010. Though LeT and al-Qaeda have not been organizational collaborators, but their fighters and training, post 2010, had been overlapping, thanks to their ISI handlers.
Here, since 2010, Taliban of Afghanistan was moving out of clutches of the Radicalized Islamic narrative of Pakistan Army, and started being more Afghan
Nationalist. Seeing the grip on Taliban wavering, Pakistan Army courted ISIS since 2014, and by 2017 had TTP also in their grips, all up against Afghanistan Taliban’s philosophy of Afghan Identity.